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Abstract 
 
This report is the fourth part of a PhD project called “The Econometrics of 
Maritime Safety – Recommendations to Enhance Safety at Sea” and is based on 
183,000 port state control inspections2 and 11,700 casualties from various data 
sources. Its overall objective is to provide recommendations to improve safety at 
sea. The fourth part looks into measuring the effect of inspections on the 
probability of casualty on either seriousness or casualty first event to show the 
differences across the regimes. It further gives a link of casualties that were found 
during inspections with either the seriousness of casualties and casualty first 
events which reveals three areas of improvement possibilities to potentially 
decrease the probability of a casualty – the ISM code, machinery and equipment 
and ship and cargo operations. 
 
                                                
1 Econometric Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, NL-3000 DR, Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands, email: s.knapp@vienna.at or franses@few.eur.nl 
2 The authors would like to thank the following secretariats for their kind co-operations: Paris 
MoU, Indian Ocean MoU, Viña del Mar Agreement on PSC, Caribbean MoU, Australian Maritime 
Safety Authority, the United States Coast Guard, Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, Lloyd’s Maritime 
Intelligence Unit, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Right Ship and the 
Greenaward Foundation. 
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1. Overview of Datasets and Variables Used 
Chapter 1 of this report are extracts from Knapp (2006)3 which are necessary in order to 
explain the datasets and variable preparation as a basis for the analysis explained in 
chapter 3. 
 
Three datasets have been used for the analysis and their relation can be seen in Figure 1. 
Set A consists of the inspection database of 183,819 inspections from various Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoU4) for the time period January 1999 to December 2004 where the 
time period is not fully covered by all regimes. This total dataset is a combination of six 
individual inspection datasets and when aggregated, it accounts for approx. 26,020 ships5 
where the average amount of inspections per vessel is by 7 per ship or 1.7 inspections per 
ship per year.6  
 
Figure 1: Overview of Datasets Used 
 
 
Set C represents an approximation of the total ships in existence7. Out of these vessels, 
ships below 400 gt8 and ship types which are not eligible for port state control inspection 
                                                
3 Knapp, S. (2006), The Econometrics of Maritime Safety – Recommendations to Enhance Safety at 
Sea, Doctoral Thesis (to be published), Econometric Institute, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
4 A memorandum of understanding (MOU) is a legal document describing an agreement between 
parties but is less formal than a contract. 
5 25,836 exact ships plus 184 estimated ships. Since there are 1,288 ships with missing IMO 
numbers out of the total port state control dataset and the average number of inspections per ship 
lies by 7, the unidentified ships can be aggregated to another 184 inspected ships. 
6 Based on an average of 4 inspection years which is the average of the total months per regime to 
bring the different years of data to the same level for all regimes. The total time period Jan. 1999 
to Dec. 2004 therefore represents a total of full 4 inspection years instead of 6 years. 
7 As per data received from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay. 
8 As per Marpol 73/78, Annex I, Regulation 4 which identifies the vessels subject to mandatory 
surveys (page 51) 
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such as fishing vessels, government ships, yachts and ferries (for the Paris MoU) have 
been eliminated from this dataset which leaves approx. 43,817 ships (46,75% of the total) 
for inspection. Since the amount of inspections from the Paris MoU is the dominating part 
of this dataset and ferries are treated separately in the EU, ferries have been excluded 
from PSC eligible ships. The total estimated inspection coverage by the regimes in 
question of eligible ships is 59.4% between set A and the eligible ships of Set C for the 
time period in question (1999-2004).  
 
Besides the port state control inspection dataset, a small industry inspection dataset has 
been collected and comprises of vetting inspection information9 of vetting inspections 
performed on oil tankers and dry bulk carriers from Rightship. In addition, oil tankers 
which are certified by Greenaward have also been identified. The casualty and industry 
data is linked to the port state control data by the IMO number and within the same time 
frame. 
 
This total dataset is a combination of six individual inspection datasets and when 
aggregated, it accounts for approx. 26,020 ships10 where the average amount of 
inspections per vessel is 7 per ship or 1.7 inspections per year.11 Set C represents an 
approximation of the total ships in existence12. Out of these vessels, ships below 400 gt13 
and ship types which are not eligible for port state control inspection such as fishing 
vessels, government ships, yachts and ferries have been eliminated from this dataset 
which leaves approx. 44,047 ships (47% of the total) for inspection. The total estimated 
inspection coverage by the regimes in question of eligible ships lies therefore by slightly 
above 59% between set A and the eligible ships of Set C.  
 
Set B is the casualty dataset which consists of 11,701 records for time period 1993 to 2004 
and is a combination of data received from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, LMIU14 and the 
IMO (International Maritime Organization). The time period 2000 to 2004 is the most 
complete casualty dataset since it draws from all three datasets. Aggregated, this dataset 
accounts for approx. 9,598 ships or 10% of the total ships in existence from Set C where 
the average amount of casualties per ship is by 1.2. Port State relevant casualties without 
the fishing fleet aggregate to 6005 ships for the time period 1999 to 2004 or 13.7% of the 
total PSC eligible ships. 
 
The sets are used in various ways depending on the kind of analysis which is conducted. 
In essence the combination of these datasets gives insight into the amount of ships that 
are inspected/not inspected, detained/not detained and have/do not have a casualty with 
their respective combinations. Figure 2 gives an overview of the variables used for all 
types of analysis for port state control and casualties where the link between the two 
datasets is given by the IMO number and the dates of inspection/casualty respectively. 
 
                                                
9 Rightship Rating Data (48,834 records of which 37,080 are used) and Greenaward Data on 
certified ships (244 records) 
10 25,838 exact ships plus 184 estimated ships. Since there are 1,288 ships with missing IMO 
numbers out of the total port state control dataset and the average number of inspections per ship 
lies by 7, the unidentified ships can be aggregated to another 184 inspected ships. 
11 Based on an average of 4 inspection years which is the average of the total months per regime to 
bring the different years of data to the same level for all regimes. The total time period Jan. 1999 
to Dec. 2004 therefore represents a total of full 4 inspection years instead of 6 years. 
12 As per data received from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay. 
13 As per Marpol 73/78, Annex I, Regulation 4 which identifies the vessels subject to mandatory 
surveys (page 51) 
14 Lloyds Maritime Intelligence Unit 
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This short introduction to the research questions, the methods and datasets used to 
conduct the analysis should provide enough evidence that the subject is covered from 
various angles and that great care was placed on the selection of the datasets and the 
data preparation. 
 
Given the datasets used for the quantitative part, it can be assumed that with almost 
60% of coverage of port state control data, a sensible interpretation can be made even 
with the lack of data from one of the major safety regimes – the Tokyo MoU where 
cooperation for this analysis unfortunately could not be obtained.  
 
Figure 2: Overview of Variables Used 
 
Note: DoC = Document of Compliance Company, an ISM requirement 
 
Depending on the type and method of analysis, either dummy variables for each variable 
are used or the data is coded into groups (e.g. flag states can be used individually or 
grouped into black, grey or white listed flag states). The incorporation of the ownership of 
a vessel is not a straight forward task in shipping and requires some careful thinking. 
Two types of variable groups have therefore been used. The first one is information 
concerning the Document of Compliance Company (DoC) of a vessel based on information 
received from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay and the second one and due to the lack of the 
completeness of information on the DoC Company is the addition on the ownership of a 
company which represents the “beneficial owner”15. Variable transformation and 
regrouping was performed for port state control data and casualty data. Transformation 
tables were used to re-code all of the following variables: 
 
1) Flag States (Black, Grey, White, Undefined) – Paris MoU 
2) Classification Societies – IACS and Not IACS recognized 
3) Ownership of a vessel as per Alderton & Winchester or technical management as 
per LR Fairplay (DoC Company) 
4) Ship Types 
 
                                                
15 based on Lloyd’s Register Fairplay data of the “World Shipping Encyclopedia CD” and Lloyd’s 
“Maritime Database CD” 
At time of construction 
At time of inspection/casualty 
PORT STATE CONTROL CASUALTIES 
Construction Information 
Vessel Particulars (Age, Size, Ship Type) 
Classification Society 
Vessel Registration (Flag State) 
Beneficial Owner 
DoC Company 
Date of Inspection 
Location of Inspection 
(either country or port) 
Deficiencies 
(main deficiency coding) 
Detention 
Date of Casualty 
Location of Casualty 
Casualty First Events 
Seriousness 
Pollution 
Loss of Life, Loss of Vessel 
Link: 
IMO Number 
Industry Data 
Rightship Ranking 
Greenaward Cert. 
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Variables were recoded using a transformation table for each MoU and the casualty 
datasets into standard codes for each variable group (flag, class, owner, ship type). The 
standard coding used for the total datasets were then transferred into dummy variables 
for the regressions or descriptive statistics. 
 
Flag States 
Flag States were coded individually or grouped into four major groups according to the 
Paris MoU Black, Grey and White List16 where white listed flag states are performing 
well followed by grey. Black listed flag states are performing worst. Flag states in the 
group “undefined” are flag states that do not have enough inspections for the Paris MoU 
or do not trade in the Paris MoU area. 
 
Classification Societies (RO) 
Classification Societies have been coded individually or grouped into two groups – either 
they are a member of the International Association of Classification Society or not which 
serves as a kind of quality indicator. There are currently ten members as follows:17 
1) American Bureau of Shipping 
2) Bureau Veritas 
3) China Classification Society 
4) Det Norske Veritas 
5) Germanischer Lloyd 
6) Korean Register of Shipping 
7) Lloyd's Register 
8) Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK) 
9) Registro Italiano Navale 
10) Russian Maritime Register of Shipping 
 
Ownership or Technical Management 
Ownership is represented by two variables. It is either the “true owner” (not the 
registered one) who has the financial benefit or it is the technical manager on the ISM 
Document of Compliance18 The datasets were merged with data from Lloyds Register 
Fairplay in order to identify the ownership of a certain vessel for both variables. For the 
true ownership, the country of location was then grouped according to Alderton and 
Winchester (1999)19 to reflect the safety culture onboard. The grouping of the countries 
into six main groups is found in Appendix 1 for further reference but is as follows: 
• traditional maritime nations 
• emerging maritime nations 
• new open registries 
• old open registries 
• international open registries 
• “unknown” for unknown or missing entries. 
 
 
 
                                                
16 Paris Memorandum of Understanding Annual Reports for 2000 – 2004. 
17 As per IACS, http://www.iacs.org.uk 
18 The Document of Compliance is a requirement by the ISM (International Safety Management 
Code) Code. The technical manager responsible for the safety management of the vessel needs to 
be identified on this document. Sometimes for smaller companies, this can be the owner; otherwise 
it is contracted out to manager who runs the vessel on behalf of the owner. 
19 Alderton T. and Winchester N (2002). “Flag States and Safety: 1997-1999”. Maritime Policy and 
Management, Vol 29, No. 2, pp 151-162 
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The Selection of Ship Types 
The selection of ship types for the analyses is important and therefore considerable 
amount of time was spent to find the best possible grouping. This provides a more 
accurate analysis of the probability of detention. The decision was based on five points as 
follows: 
o Point 1: Legal Base including the major conventions and related codes 
distinguishing different applications based on ship types and the deriving 
differences in conducting a port state control inspection.  
o Point 2: World Trade Flows to capture exposure of the regimes in connection with 
the % of ship types that were inspected/detained by each regime and the special 
commercial characteristics of each segment 
o Point 3: Analysis of Casualties per ship type and their severity 
o Point 4: Analysis of Regression Results of port state control data for each ship type 
and in aggregated version 
o Point 5: Correspondence Analysis based on port state control data in order to 
visualize the effects on aggregating the data and to provide an overall 
confirmation on the selection of the grouping of ship types. 
 
Taking the decision points listed above into account where the detailed analyses involved 
to derive at the grouping is shown in Knapp (2006) in detail, the following ship types have 
been aggregated out of the 19 original ship types: 
 
1. General Cargo & Multipurpose (General Cargo, Ro-Ro Cargo, Reefer Cargo, 
Heavy Load) 
2. Dry Bulk  
3. Container 
4. Tanker (Tanker, Oil Tanker, Chemical Tankers, Gas Carriers, OBO) 
5. Passenger Vessel (Passenger Ships, Ro-Ro Passenger, HS Passenger) 
6. Other (Offshore, Special Purpose, Factory Ship, Mobile Offshore, Other Ship 
Types) 
 
 
2. Descriptive Statistics and Key Figures for Casualties 
2.1. Selection of Port State Control Relevant Casualties 
Considerate care was given on the selection of casualties for the analysis. From the 
casualty dataset within the time period 1999 to 2004 of 9,851 cases, the following cases 
were eliminated. 
1. Cases due to extreme weather conditions such as hurricanes, typhoons, gales and 
very heavy storms 
2. Ships attacked by pirates or ships lost due to war 
3. Ships involved in a collision with no identified fault20 
4. Any other miscellaneous items not relevant to PSC such as drugs found, virus 
outbreaks of passengers or accidents which happened in dry docks 
5. Not PSC relevant ships types such as ferries, the fishing fleet, tugs or government 
vessels. The fishing fleet cases were kept separate and a separate analysis was 
performed based only on the fishing fleet above 400gt. 
                                                
20 The identification of “no fault” in this case was not straight forward and some cases still 
included in the dataset might be ships with no fault and were not eliminated due to lack of 
exactness of data. 
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The remaining 6291 cases concern 6,005 ships when aggregated by IMO number and 
were then reviewed and re-grouped into the three groups of seriousness as per IMO MSC 
Circular 953 of December 2000:21  
 
1. Very serious casualties: casualties to ships which involve total loss of the ship, 
loss of life or severe pollution 
2. Serious casualties are casualties to ships which do not qualify as “very serious 
casualties” and which involve fire, explosion, collision, grounding, contact, heavy 
weather damage, ice damage, hull cracking, or suspected hull defect, etc. resulting 
in: immobilization of main engines, extensive accommodation damage, severe 
structural damage, such as penetration of the hull under water, etc. rendering the 
ship unfit to proceed, or pollution (regardless of quantity); and/or a breakdown 
necessitation towage or shore assistance. 
3. Less serious casualties are casualties to ships which do not qualify as “very 
serious casualties” or “serious casualties” and for the purpose of recording useful 
information also include “marine incidents” which themselves include “hazardous 
incidents” and “near misses”. 
 
In addition to the classification of seriousness of casualties, the cases were also examined 
and re-classified according to casualty first events. The casualty first events are classified 
as follows:  
o Deck and Hull related casualties: Deck and hull related items such as maintenance 
items (cracks, holes, fractures, hatch cover problems, cargo equipment failure, 
lifeboat gear failure, anchor and mooring ropes problems), stability related items 
such as capsizing, listing, cargo shifts and flooding 
o Fire/Explosion: Fire and Explosion anywhere on the vessel (main areas are engine 
room) 
o Engine or machinery related casualties: Engine related items including engine 
breakdown, black outs, steering gear failure and propulsion failure 
o Wrecked/Stranded/Grounded: Wrecked, Stranded, Grounded where a large 
portion of the ships in this category are stranded or grounded. 112 ships in this 
category are ships that were lost and therefore could probably be classified as 
wrecked. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the analysis, this category is to be 
interpreted primarily for stranded and grounded vessels. 
o Collision and Contact: Collision and Contact  
 
Figure 3 then gives an overview of the split up of the casualty first events. The graph is 
not detailed but can be understood as a first attempt to break up the casualty types into 
relevant categories. 
 
The lack of information and fragmentation of the data does not permit a better split up. 
Interesting to see is the high amount of engine and machinery related events of about 
32% (engine breakdown, engine black out, steering gear failure and propulsion failure) 
while the probability of detention has shown a relative low probability of detention based 
on deficiencies in the area of propulsion and auxiliary machinery (code 1400). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 as per IMO MSC Circular 953, 14th December 2000 
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Figure 3: Casualty First Events per Ship Type (1999 to 2004) 
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2.2. Overview of Deficiencies and Casualties 
Figure 4 gives an overview of the mean amount of deficiencies found six month prior to a 
casualty per flag state group while Figure 5 shows the split up for IACS recognized 
classification societies and non IACS recognized classification societies. 
 
Figure 4: Mean Amount of Deficiencies per Flag State: 6 months prior to casualty 
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Note: based on ships that were inspected six month prior to casualty 
 
Black listed flag states have an average of 4.3 deficiencies versus 1.7 deficiencies for 
white listed flag states. Ships of Non-IACS classification societies have an average of 6.5 
deficiencies versus 2.4 for ships with ICAS classification in an inspection at least six 
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months prior to a casualty. Figure 6 shows the mean amount of deficiencies that are 
found previous to a casualty per seriousness of casualty and detention. Ships that have 
been detained show a significant higher amount of deficiencies than ships that have not 
been detained prior to a casualty.  
 
Figure 5: Mean Amount of Deficiencies per Class: 6 months prior to casualty 
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Note: based on ships that were inspected six month prior to casualty 
 
Figure 6: Mean Amount of Deficiencies per Seriousness of Casualty 
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Note: based on ships that were inspected six month prior to casualty 
 
The next chapter will provide the probability of casualty as refined view and based on 
either seriousness or casualty first event. It further provides models which link the 
deficiencies found during and inspection with the casualty first events to identify room for 
improvements of inspections. 
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3. The Probability of Casualty – Refined View 
3.1. Description of Model and Methodology 
This model will provide the estimated probability (P) of a ship having a casualty based on 
each ship type defined previously for each safety regime. The dependent variable (y) in 
this case is “casualty” or “no casualty”. In a binary regression, a latent variable y* gets 
mapped onto a binominal variable y which can be 1 (casualty) or 0 (no casualty). When 
this latent variable exceeds a threshold, which is typically equal to 0, it gets mapped onto 
1, other wise onto 0. The latent variable itself can be expressed as a standard linear 
regression model 
 
y*i  =  xiβ + εi 
 
where i denotes ship i. The xi contains independent variables such as age, size, flag, 
classification society or owner, and β represents a column vector of unknown parameters 
(the coefficients). The binary regression model can be derived as follows:22 
 
P (yi = 1|xi)  = P (y*i > 0| xi) = P (xiβ + εi > 0|xi) = P (εi > - xiβ|xi) = P (εi ≤ xiβ|xi) 
 
The last term is equal to the cumulative distribution function of εi  evaluated in xiβ, or in 
short: 
 
P (yi = 1|xi) = F (xiβ) 
 
This function F can take many forms and for this study two were considered, namely the 
cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution (probit model) and the 
cumulative distribution function of the logistic function (logit model). The general model 
can therefore be written in the form of Equation 1 where the term xiβ changes according 
to the model in question. 
 
Equation 1: Probability of Casualty (per seriousness) 
β)x
β)x
i
i
P (
(
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To estimate the coefficients, quasi-maximum likelihood (QML)23 is used as method of 
estimation in order to give some allowance for a possible misspecification of the assumed 
underlying distribution function. For the final models, logit and probit models are 
compared to see if there are any significant differences and logit models are used for the 
visualization part. 
 
Figure 7 provides an overview of the steps that were taken in order to perform the 
analysis which will be described in the next chapter.  
 
                                                
22 for further reference, refer to Franses, P.H. and Paap, R. (2001). Quantitative Models in 
Marketing Research. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Chapter 4 
23 for further details on QML, refer to Greene H.W. (2000), Econometric Analysis, Fourth Edition, 
page 823ff 
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The first step is the same as mentioned in the previous chapter and will therefore not be 
explained again in detail. The bases for the casualties are all ships with port state control 
relevant casualties – a total of 6,005 ships. 
 
Figure 7: Description of Methodology Used 
 
 
 
3.2. Explanation of Relevant Datasets and Procedure to Match Ships 
The second step was then to link the ships with a casualty to the ships without casualty 
and 3,956 ships emerged to show a connection based on the IMO number and were taken 
into further consideration. These vessels provide the basis for several merges within a 
certain time frame in order to gain a better overview of the connection between casualties 
and port state control inspections. The following results are listed in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: Datasets for Port State Control and Casualty Merges Performed 
 
Datasets 
Criteria Used for Data 
Links 
Total 
Inspections 
Total 
Casualties 
Total 
Records 
Total 
Ships 
Set 1 Inspections with no casualties 148,557 Nil 148,557 21,880 
Set 2A Time Frame: 6 months 23,401 2,921 26,322 2,321 
Set 2B No Time Frame 33,974 4,737 38,711 3,956 
 
The datasets show three scenarios where set 2B does not contain any particular time 
frame between an inspection and a casualty. The remaining set is based on a minimum of 
at least one connection of an inspection prior to a casualty of 6 months. After this merge 
was performed, the remaining inspections and if applicable casualties of a particular 
vessel were added in order to account for the whole inspection history of a vessel.  
 
Step 3 is the starting point to create a dataset which is then used in the analysis. The 
idea is to match ships from the datasets described earlier, and which had casualties, with 
ships that did not have casualties. In order to match ships from each of the groups, a set 
of variables had to be identified to guarantee the best possible match.  
 
Step 1 
Step 2 
Step 3 
The selection of PSC relevant casualties and the 
classification of the cases by seriousness according to 
IMO classification 
The selection of relevant datasets of inspections and 
casualties based on a time frame of six months and no 
time frame 
The selection of the variables that are used to match 
ships for the datasets identified under step 2 and the 
execution of the matching. 
Step 4 
The preparation and calculation of the variables used in 
the regression and based on the matches found under 
step 3. 
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These variables are assumed not to have a direct impact on the seriousness of a casualty 
and are listed in order of importance given the fact that the difference of observations in 
the datasets is quiet large. In doing the match, the first three variables are the most 
important ones followed by the country the ship was constructed and the owner and then 
the remaining variables such as class, flag and hull details for tankers.  
 
Table 2: List of Variables used to Match Ships 
1. Ship Type at the time of construction 
2. Year Built (in 11 ranges) 
3. Gross Tonnage (in 44 ranges) 
4. Country of Owner at time of construction 
5. Country where Ship was primarily built 
6. Class at construction 
7. Flag at construction 
8. Double Hull 
 
Ship type is found to be the most important variable for determining the construction 
quality and operating environment of a ship. Out of the total 25,836 ships from the 
inspection dataset, 1546 ships were converted or alternated since construction and 290 
ships changed their ship type completely.  
 
The matching was performed between Set 1 and Set2B using Oracle24 and following the 
methodology which is visualized in Figure 8. Set 2A is a subset of Set 2B and is then 
extracted from the result of the basic match performed on Set 2B. The match was 
performed in two rounds where double matches for ships with casualties are allowed out 
of the dataset of ships with inspections only. The first round matches the vessels on the 
three basic criteria listed in the figure namely: ship type, age and tonnage. From the 
21,880 available ships, 17,727 were used to match and 4,153 records were not used. 
 
Figure 8: Visualization of Matching Methodology (per Ship) 
 
                                                
24 Credit is given here to Ratan Singh Ratore who assisted the author in performing this match by 
providing the necessary software (Oracle) and SQL statements to execute the queries. 
+ 
3 Main Criteria 
for Basic Match: 
 
Ship Type 
Age Group 
Tonnage Group 
Round 1:   297,532 matches with 3,916 casualties 
Degree 8:  122,295 matches with 3769 casualties: 187 lost 
Round 2:       2,491 matches with   147 casualties:   40 lost 
Set 1: inspections only 
21,880 ships 
(17,727 used) 
Set 2B: with casualties 
3,956 ships 
(3,916 used) 
5 Secondary Criteria: points Rd1 points Rd2 
Owner at construction       5       1 
Shipyard Country       4       1 
Class at construction       3       1 
Flag at construction       2       1 
Double Hull        1       1 
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This is then followed by a refinement of the matches using the remaining criteria in order 
of importance with weighted points. The basic match comes up with 297,532 matches for 
3,916 ships with casualties. The refinement match based on ownership (5 points), the 
ship yard country (4 points), the class at construction (3 points) and the flag state at 
construction (2 points) reduces the basic matches to 122,295 hits with 3,769 ships with 
casualties by using a degree 8 to match ships. The decision to allocate points is not based 
on any empirical evidence of the impact of the variables on the construction quality. It is 
based on the author’s understanding of the shipping industry and partly derived from 
interviews25 with surveyors who have experience with new buildings, naval architects 
and one of the ship owner’s associations26. 
 
Degree 8 means that the matching ships have both eight points out of the total of 15 
points which would be a perfect twin. Several scenarios were run using various degrees of 
matching before a decision was made to use degree eight for the analysis and the results 
are shown in Table 3. The table lists the degrees of matches (as total points of the point 
allocated per additional criteria), the matches of ships with inspections, the number of 
ships with casualties that were used and not used and the % of casualties that are lost to 
the total casualties (3,956).  
 
The last column indicates which of the scenarios is then accepted for the analysis. Degree 
eight was chosen because it provides a balanced result of loosing 4.7% of the cases with 
casualties by having a matching degree of 8 points out of 15 total points where eight 
points means that at least three out of the five additional criteria are matched besides the 
three basic criteria. 
 
With degree 8, 187 ships did not have a corresponding ship. Since 23 cases are very 
serious casualties and 115 cases serious casualties, a second round of matching was 
performed on these ships by using a simplified point system for the remaining criteria (1 
point instead of the weighted point system). The resulting basic match based on degree 1 
(at least two more variables match besides the three basic ones) reveals 2,491 hits with 
147 ships with casualties.  
 
Table 3: Summary of Matches by Degrees for Round 1(by Ship) 
Degrees 
of Match 
Ships with 
Inspections 
Matched 
Ships with 
Casualties 
Used 
Ships with 
Casualties  
Not Used 
% Ships Lost 
to 
Total (3,956) 
Dataset 
Used for 
Analysis 
15 6,840 1,757 2,199 55.5% Yes 
14 n/a 1,788 2,168 54.8% No 
13 n/a 2,829 1,127 28.5% No 
12 n/a 3,021 935 23.6% No 
11 n/a 3,166 790 19.9% No 
10 47,768 3,394 562 14.2% No 
9 106,658 3,720 236 5.9% No 
8 122,295 3,769 187 4.7% Yes 
7 124,172 3,781 175 4.4% No 
 
A total of 40 ships do not have any corresponding vessel out of the inspection dataset. 
From these 40 ships, 6 had a very serious casualty, 24 a serious casualty and 10 a less 
serious casualty. These 40 ships are not used in the analysis. The final results of the 
match are presented in Table 4 and are based on ship counts (a ship can have several 
                                                
25 For detailed list of interviews performed by the author can be found in the Bibliography. 
26 Dutch Royal Ship Owner’s Association 
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casualties). The column indicating the ships with casualties lost is based on the number 
of ships with casualties as listed in Table 1 and the actual number of ships that found 
matches. This match provides the basis for the models that will follow. In addition to the 
six months time frame, a separate match was performed based on perfect twins instead of 
degree 8 in order to see if enough observations are available to use this dataset. From the 
total amount of observations of 8,597 cases in comparison to 77,599 cases, one can easily 
see that the amount of observations is limited. It is therefore decided to only use the 
dataset based on degree 8 and with the time frame of six months prior to a casualty. 
 
Table 4: Summary of Matched Datasets (by Ship) 
 
Final Datasets 
Ships with 
Inspections 
Round 1 & 2 
Ships with 
Casualties  
Round 1 & 2 
Ships with 
Casualties 
Lost 
Total 
Dataset 
Cases 
No Time Frame 124,786 3,916 40 128,702 
6 months 75,302 2,297 24 77,599 
Perfect Twins 6,840 1,757 n/a 8,597 
 
Table 5 gives an overview of the types of models that are used. The table lists the types of 
models with the total amount of regressions in each series, the datasets on which the 
models are based on and the variables that are of interest in each of the regressions. Type 
I model is based on the seriousness of casualty and should give an overview of the 
effectiveness of an inspection (per regime) on the probability of either a very serious, 
serious or less serious casualty. Type II is an aggregated model which uses multiplicative 
dummy variables for the deficiencies and ship types in order to see if there are any 
significant differences with respect to deficiencies found before an inspection and the ship 
types. It can be seen as a further refinement of the type I models but only for very serious 
and serious casualties. 
 
Table 5: List of Twin Models and their Variables of Interest 
Model Name Types of Model/Data based on Variables of interest 
Type I Models 
(Total Models: 3) 
Based on twins of ships inspected six 
months prior to a casualty  
Types are as follows*): 
o Very serious (5,826) 
o Serious (45,486) 
o Less serious (27,411) 
Time in-between inspection 
Detention 
Deficiencies (less serious) 
Regimes (overall view) 
Vetting Inspections 
Type II Model 
(Total Model: 1) 
Based on twins of ships inspected six 
months prior to a casualty but combined of 
very serious and serious casualties in order 
to increase the amount of observations. The 
deficiencies are multiplied by ship types 
and used as multiplicative dummies 
Total # of observations: (52,150) 
Time in-between inspection 
Detention 
Deficiencies per ship type 
Regimes (overall view) 
Type III Models 
(Total Models: 5) 
Based on casualties of a respective first 
event in relation to the deficiencies found 
during a PSC inspection. Types are as 
follows: 
o Fire & Explosion (6,218) 
o Wrecked/Stranded/Grounded (19,131) 
o Collision/Contact (23,254) 
o Deck Related First Events (8,357) 
o Engine Related First Events (27,079) 
Time in-between inspection 
Detention 
Deficiencies (refined view) 
Regimes (overall view) 
*) Note: the numbers in brackets are number of observations in the model 
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The type III models are based on the casualty first events identified at the beginning of 
this report and are a first attempt to link the deficiencies with casualties. The next 
section will explain the variables and the base model itself which is then applied 
according to the type I, II or III models. 
 
3.3. Explanation of Variables used in the Models 
The variables listed in Table 6 are a summary of the variables that are used in the 
regressions. The variables are split into two blocks where block 1 contains the variables 
which are normally used to target vessels such as the ship type, the classification society, 
the flag state and the ownership of a vessel and block 2 provides a summary of the 
inspection history of a particular vessel including information on industry inspections 
(vetting inspections of Rightship and Greenaward). 
 
Table 6: Variables Used in the Twin Regressions (Type I, II and III models) 
  Dependent Variable 1: Casualty: 
This can be either per seriousness or by casualty first event 1/0 
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 ℓ Block 1: Ship Particulars: included to account for target factors 
Ln(Age) 1 Average age at Inspection 1 C  
Ln(SIZE) 2 Gross Tonnage 1 C  
ST 3 Ship Type at present 6 D  
STInd 4 Ship Type Changed 1 D  
CL 5 Classification Society at inspection 33 D  
CLInd 6 Classification Society changed 1 D  
CLWdr 7 Class Withdrawn 1 D  
FS 8 Flag State at inspection 81 D  
FSInd 9 Flag State Changed 1 D  
OWN 10 Owner of vessel 6 D  
OWNInd 11 Ownership changed 1 D  
LIOWN 12 Legal Instruments Rectified (Owner) 1 C  
LIFS 13 Legal Instruments Rectified (Flag) 1 C  
DH 14 Double Hull 1 D  
  Block 2: Inspection History: variables of interest 
RS 15 Rightship Inspected (5 Star Rating or indicator) 5 D neg 
GR 16 Greenaward Certified 1 D neg 
ln(TIME) 17 Time in between inspections (days) 1 C neg 
PSC 18 Inspections Frequency per Regime (Fractions) 6 D neg 
DETPS 19 Detention Frequency per Regime 6 D neg 
CODE 20 Deficiency main codes (also multiplied by ST) 26 (156) C und 
  Total Variables*) 181(311)   
*) in brackets indicates number of multiplicative dummy variables 
C= Continuous, D= Dummy 
 
Within block 1, changes in any of the variables since the construction of the vessel and 
during the years of inspection history are identified (e.g. the ship type was converted, 
flag, class or ownership changed). This block also includes information the number of 
legal instruments a certain flag or country of residence of an owner has rectified. 
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Since the whole inspection and casualty history of a particular vessel is taken into 
consideration, average percentage fractions over all records of one particular vessel 
(aggregated by IMO number) are used in the regressions for the inspections and the 
detentions while the deficiencies are aggregated and represent a total sum. In addition 
and depending on the final model, the variables indicating where the ship was inspected 
can be replaced by the actual port states and the deficiencies can be multiplied by ship 
types and therefore increases the amount of variables accordingly. The increased amount 
of variables is shown in brackets in the table. 
 
Figure 9 visualizes the variable structure of the twin models by following a time line of a 
pair of vessels over its course of life and the model can be written in the form of Equation 
1 where the term xiβ can change accordingly to the casualty model in question (either per 
seriousness of casualty or by casualty first event) and is given in Equation 2 and its 
variables are further explained in Table 6. 
 
Figure 9: Visualization of Variable Structure: Twin Models 
 
Note: Variables of interest are in italic 
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Equation 2: Detailed Effect of Inspections (Seriousness or First Event) 
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The model produces probabilities on an individual ship level (i). The rest of the notation is 
as follows: ℓ represents the variable groups, nℓ is the total number of variables within 
each group of ℓ and k is an index from 1 to nℓ 
 
3.4. Model Evaluation and Final Results (type I, II and III models) 
Table 7 provides a split up of the ships with casualties into their seriousness which is the 
basis for the type I and II models. 
 
Table 7: Summary of Matched Dataset by Seriousness of Casualty (by Ship) 
Final Datasets Very Serious Serious Less Serious 
By Seriousness Casualties Total Cases Casualties Total Cases Casualties 
Total 
Cases 
No Time Frame 306 10,778 2,345 77,980 1,457 44,882 
6 months 167*) 6,007 1,387 46,522 881 28,008 
Perfect Twins 156 958 1,033 4,824 641 3,091 
*) Note: figures are with passenger vessels and the Caribbean MoU while final models are without 
these variables due to lack of data 
 
Type II is based on a combined dataset for very serious and serious casualties. The 
figures are based on the number of ships and since a ship can have multiple casualties, 
some ships are counted in each of the casualty categories. The table provides the number 
of ships with a certain type of casualty and the corresponding total cases (ships with 
casualties and inspections). 
 
The type III models are a series of five regressions which link casualty first events with 
deficiencies that are found previously. The basis for these regressions is all ships that 
were inspected six month prior to a casualty, a total of 2321 ships. The corresponding 
datasets are listed in Table 8 below. 
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Table 8: Summary of Matched Dataset by Casualty First Events (by Ship) 
Casualty First Event Casualties Twins Total Obs 
Fire/Explosion 213 6005 6218 
Wrecked/Stranded/Grounded 526 18605 19131 
Collision/Contact 713 22541 23254 
Deck Related 253 8104 8357 
Engine Related 819 26260 27079 
*) Figures are with the Caribbean MoU and all ship types while final model can vary accordingly 
 
All models were tested for the presence of heteroscedasticity using the LM test as 
described by Davidson and McKinnon (1993)27. The null hypothesis (ho) assumes 
homoscedasticity and the alternative hypothesis assumes heteroscedasticity in the 
following form where γ is unknown and z are a number of variables which are assumed to 
be the cause of heteroscedasticity: 
 
Variance = exp (2z’γ) 
 
A summary of the findings can be seen in Table 9 for the type I and type II models where 
ho is rejected only for tonnage in the type II model. Based on Knapp (2006, chapter 6)28 
where probabilities were calculated based on a model developed by Greene29 and based on 
Harvey (1976) and no significant difference was found between the normal and the 
corrected model, it is assumed that the presence of heteroscedasticity for the variable 
tonnage does not have a serious effect of the estimated probabilities. 
 
Table 9: Test Statistics for LM-Test: Type I and II models 
Type of Model Variable 
Tested 
LM-Statistic p-value 
6m very serious (type I) Age 4.261 0.0389 – do not reject ho 
 Tonnage 4.061 0.0438 – do not reject ho 
Combined model (type II) Age 5.900 0.0268 – do not reject ho 
 Tonnage 20.998 0.0000 - reject ho 
Note: 1% significance level used 
 
 
The results for the type III models are shown in Table 10 where no presence of 
heteroscedasticity could be identified for the variables in question. The remaining 
statistics of the final models for type I and type II are then presented in Table 11 and for 
the type III models in Table 12. The table lists the number of observations in each model, 
the number of twin outliers that were identified and eliminated, the cut off rate and a 
summary of other relevant statistics. 
 
One cannot see any major difference between probit and logit. The models were reduced 
using a 1% significance level. Only two variables (deficiency codes) in the less serious 
casualty model are left in the model at a 5 % significance level. The results are acceptable 
for the amount of observations in each model. For the type I models, the hit rate and the 
                                                
27 Davidson and McKinnon (1993), Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, page 526ff 
28 Knapp, S. (2006), The Econometrics of Maritime Safety – Recommendations to Enhance Safety 
at Sea, Doctoral Thesis (to be published), Econometric Institute, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
29 Greene H.W. (2000), Econometric Analysis, Fourth Edition, Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall, 
New Jersey; page 518ff; Furthermore, recognition is to be given to Richard Paap from the 
Econometric Institute for pointing this program out to me and for making it available to me. 
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McFadden R2 is higher for the very serious models compared to the other two model types 
and the HL-statistic indicates a better fit. Logit models are used for the visualization 
part. 
 
Table 10: Test Statistics for LM-Test: Type III models 
Model Variable Tested LM-
Statistic 
p-value 
Fire/Explosion Age n/a n/a 
 Tonnage 1.255 0.2625 - do not reject ho 
Wrecked/Stranded/Grounded Age 0.279 0.5967 - do not reject ho 
 Tonnage 0.398 0.5276 - do not reject ho 
Collision/Contact Age 1.019 0.3126 - do not reject ho 
 Tonnage 2.448 0.1176 - do not reject ho 
Deck Related First Events Age 0.194 0.6600 - do not reject ho 
 Tonnage 0.302 0.5823 - do not reject ho 
Engine Related First Events Age 0.176 0.6744 - do not reject ho 
 Tonnage 0.261 0.6091 - do not reject ho 
Note: 1% significance level was used 
 
Table 11: Summary of Statistics – Type I and II Model 
 6 months Time Frame 
Type I Models very serious serious less serious 
0 = 5665 0 = 44124 0 = 26551 
1 = 161 1 = 1362 1 = 860 
# observations in 
final model 
Total = 5826 Total = 45486 Total = 27411 
# outliers (twins) none none none 
Cut Off 0.0276 0.0299 0.0314 
  LOG PRO LOG PRO LOG PRO 
Mc Fadden R2 0.166 0.162 0.139 0.139 0.077 0.077 
% Hit Rate y=0 73.93 72.22 70.00 68.28 66.95 66.00 
% Hit Rate y=1 71.43 72.67 73.35 75.18 64.07 65.23 
% Hit Rate Tot 73.86 72.23 70.10 68.49 66.86 65.97 
HL-Stat. (df=8) 9.41 19.54 3.00 16.60 9.75 9.62 
p-value 0.3088 0.0120 0.9343 0.0345 0.2832 0.2927 
Remarks 
w/o passenger vessels 
and Caribbean MoU 
with passenger vessels but without Caribbean 
MoU 
 Type II Model (VS and Serious)  
 0 = 50610   
 1 = 1540   
 
# observations in 
final model 
Total = 52150  
 # outliers (twins) none  
 Cut Off 0.0295   
   LOG PRO   
 Mc Fadden R2 0.130 0.1292   
 % Hit Rate y=0 68.88 67.09   
 % Hit Rate y=1 72.53 74.09   
 % Hit Rate Tot 68.98 67.29   
 HL-Stat. (df=8) 11.749 24.39   
 p-value 0.1633 0.0020   
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Table 12: Summary of Statistics – Type III Models 
  6 months Time Frame 
  Fire/Explosion 
Wrecked/ 
Stranded/Grounded Collision/Contact 
0 = 5484 0 = 18098 0 = 21641 
1 = 191 1 = 502 1 = 688 
# observations in final 
model 
Total = 5675 Total = 18600 Total = 22329 
# outliers (twins) none none none 
Cut Off 0.0337 0.02698 0.0308 
  LOG PRO LOG PRO LOG PRO 
Mc Fadden R2 0.088 0.088 0.070 0.0698 0.068 0.068 
% Hit Rate y=0 66.63 65.24 67.05 66.07 67.89 66.74 
% Hit Rate y=1 66.49 67.54 64.34 65.94 61.48 62.35 
% Hit Rate Tot 66.63 65.32 66.98 66.06 67.70 66.61 
HL-Stat. (df=8) 9.08 5.00 13.78 15.28 6.72 4.74 
p-value 0.3360 0.7574 0.0878 0.0539 0.5666 0.7849 
    
  Deck Related Engine Related Remarks 
0 = 7538 0 = 26260 All  Models except 
1 = 233 1 = 819 Engine rel. casualties 
# observations in final 
model 
Total = 7771 Total = 27079 are w/o the Caribbean 
# outliers (twins) none none plus:   
Cut Off 0.0300 0.0310 Fire: w/o container 
  LOG PRO LOG PRO WSG: w/o passenger 
Mc Fadden R2 0.079 0.079 0.084 0.085 and other ST 
% Hit Rate y=0 65.46 64.13 69.72 68.74 COCO: w/o other ST 
% Hit Rate y=1 67.81 69.96 63.00 64.22 Deck: w/o passenger 
% Hit Rate Tot 65.53 64.30 69.52 68.60 and other ST 
HL-Stat. (df=8) 4.80 4.15 6.32 3.90     
p-value 0.7789 0.8438 0.6111 0.8664     
Note: WSG = Wrecked, Stranded, Grounded, COCO = Collision/Contact 
 
The results of the type III models are not as good as the models based on the seriousness 
of casualty which is expected to be the case. The results are still acceptable and the hit 
rate is still above 65% for all models. The models had to be adapted according to the 
number of observations and for most models (except engine related), the Caribbean MoU 
had to be taken out as well as the passenger vessels and other ship types due to lack of 
data. Not much difference can be seen between the logit and the probit models and logit 
models are used for the visualization part.  
 
3.5. Visualization of Refined Results – Effect of Inspections 
Table 13 lists a summary of the coefficients of the variables of interest for the type I, type 
II and type III series of models. The main findings from this table can be summarized as 
follows and will be visualized in the sections to come. 
 
 
 Table 13: Summary of Main Variables and their Significance: All Twin Models 
  Type I Models Type II Model Type III Models 
Variables of Interest 
very 
serious serious less serious 
combined model 
very serious & serious 
Fire 
Expl. W/S/G 
Collision 
Contact 
Deck 
Related 
Engine 
Related 
Industry Inspections Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef 2nd ST Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
  Rightship 1 star (RS inspected) benchmark benchmark n/s n/s n/s -1.4344 n/s 
  Rightship 2 star -1.0013 -0.9613 -0.2872 -0.9796  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
  Rightship 3 star -1.3447 -1.1532 -0.5105 -1.1838  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
  Rightship 4 star -2.4995 -2.7490 -0.5970 -2.7714  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
  Rightship 5 star -3.0056 -3.9050 -0.7596 -3.8793  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
  Greenaward Certified n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
Port State Control Inspected/Detained               
  Time in-between inspections n/s 0.1526 0.1169 0.1107  0.1503 n/s n/s n/s 0.0938 
  Paris MoU inspected n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s 0.8225 
  Caribbean MoU inspected not in model n/s  not in model n/s 
  Viña del Mar MoU inspected -1.3812 -0.6322 -0.6322 -0.8266  -1.0950 n/s -0.9150 -1.2067 n/s 
  Indian Ocean MoU inspected n/s -1.5607 -1.5607 -1.4198  -1.5103 -1.2964 -1.1704 -2.3361 n/s 
  USCG inspected n/s n/s n/s -0.3184  n/s n/s n/s n/s 0.8545 
  AMSA inspected n/s -0.5662 -0.5662 -0.5182  n/s -1.3373 -0.8534 n/s n/s 
  Paris MoU detained n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
  Caribbean MoU detained not in model n/s  not in model n/s 
  Viña del Mar MoU detained n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
  Indian Ocean MoU detained n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
  USCG detained n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s -0.3169 
  AMSA detained n/s n/s 0.7553 n/s  n/s 0.6844 n/s n/s 0.5202 
Deficiencies Found (only significant ones are listed)  per ship type           
C0400 Food and catering n/s n/a n/s -0.6149 (ST3)  n/s n/s n/s n/s -0.1245 
C0500 Working spaces & acc.prev. n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
C0700 Fire Safety measures n/s 0.0335 n/s 0.0495 (ST1)  n/s 0.02376 n/s n/s 0.0432 
C0900 Structural Safety n/s n/s 0.0252 0.0657 (ST3)  n/s n/s 0.0315 n/s n/s 
C1000 Alarm Signals n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s 0.2636 n/s n/s n/s 
C1200 Load lines n/s n/s n/s -0.0527 (ST1) 0.1261 (ST4) n/s n/s n/s 0.0701 n/s 
C1400 Propulsion & aux.engine n/s 0.0318 0.0241 0.0467 (ST2)  0.0486 0.02231 n/s n/s 0.0645 
C1700 MARPOL A. I (Oil Pollution) n/s n/s 0.0573 n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s 0.0449 
C1800 Gas and chemical carriers 0.5037 n/s n/s n/s  0.2849 n/s n/s n/s n/s 
C1900 MARPOL A.II (Noxious L.) n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s n/s 0.5146 n/s 
C2000 SOLAS Operational def. n/s -0.0724 n/s -0.1117 (ST1)  n/s n/s n/s n/s -0.0801 
C2100 MARPOL relat. oper. def. n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s -0.3094 n/s n/s 
C2200 MARPOL A.III n/s n/s n/s n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
C2300 MARPOL A.V n/s n/s -0.1578 n/s  n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
C2500 ISM related deficiencies n/s 0.0392 n/s 0.04147 (ST1) 0.1193 (ST4) n/s n/s 0.0624 n/s n/s 
Note: n/s= not significant, n/a=not applicable, W/S/G=Wrecked, Stranded, Grounded; ST1=general cargo, ST2=dry bulk, ST3=container, ST4=tanker, ST5=passenger 
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Overall Summary 
o The coefficients for the variables indicating if a ship has been inspected by one of the 
industry vetting inspection regimes (Rightship) for bulk carriers and oil tankers are all 
negative and follow the overall ranking of a vessel30 while the coefficient of the variable 
indicating if the ship is Greenaward certified is not significant which might be just due 
to lack of data31. For the type III models, this parameter is only significant for deck 
related first events. Given the fact that those inspections are primarily carried out on 
bulk carriers, this finding is found to be in line with the general expectation. 
o The parameter of the variable indicating time in-between inspections is not significant for 
very serious casualties but is positive for all other categories of the type I and type II 
models. For the casualty first events, it is only significant for fire & explosion and engine 
related first events. 
o The coefficients of the variables indicating where the ship was inspected is mostly 
negative for serious and less serious casualties and only one regime remains significant 
for very serious casualties (Viña del Mar Agreement on PSC). For the casualty first 
events, these parameters are mostly negative or not significant with the exception for 
engine related first events where it is positive for two regimes. 
o The coefficients of the variables indicating if the ship was detained are mostly not 
significant with the exception of less serious casualties and for the categories wrecked, 
stranded or grounded and engine related first events. For engine related first events, the 
parameter is negative for one regime (USCG). 
 
Deficiencies per seriousness and ship type (type I and II models) 
o For very serious casualties, a positive effect can be found with code 1800 (gas and 
chemical carriers) and not other code remains significant. 
o For serious casualties, a negative effect can be found for codes 2000 (SOLAS operational 
deficiencies) while a positive effect can be seen with codes 700 (fire safety measures), 
codes 1400 (propulsion and aux. engine) and code 2500 (ISM code). 
o For less serious casualties, only one code shows a negative effect – code 2300 (Marpol 
Annex V). Codes with positive effect are code 900 (structural safety), code 1400 
(propulsion and aux. engines) and code 1700 (Marpol Annex I). 
o With respect to the deficiencies per ship type (type II model), codes that remain 
significant for general cargo vessels are code 700 (fire safety measures: positive), code 
1200 (load line: negative), code 2000 (SOLAS oper. safety: negative) and code 2500 (ISM 
related def.: positive). 
o For dry bulk, only one code remains significant and positive which is code 1400 
(propulsion and aux. engine). For the container vessel, codes 400 (food and catering: 
negative), code 900 (structural safety: positive) remain significant. For tankers, two 
codes remain in the model and are code 1200 (load lines: positive) and code 2500 (ISM 
related deficiencies: positive). 
 
Deficiencies per casualty first event (type III models) 
o Looking at the deficiency codes and the significance of their parameters with respect to 
the casualty first events, for fire and explosion, codes 1400 (propulsion and aux. engines) 
and code 1800 (gas and chemical carriers) are significant and positive. 
                                                
30 For Rightship, the risk associated with a vessel is ranked by stars where a 1 star vessel shows 
highest risk and a 5 star vessel shows lowest risk 
31 the total amount of Greenaward certified vessels incorporated into the dataset was only about 240 
records for the time span 2000 to 2004 
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o For the category wrecked/stranded/grounded, the remaining codes are code 700 (fire 
safety measures), code 1000 (alarm signals) and code 1400 (propulsion and aux. engines) 
are significant and positive32. 
o For collision/contact, two codes are positive as – code 900 (structural safety) and code 
2500 (ISM related def.) and one codes is negative – code 2100 (Marpol relat. operat. 
deficiencies). 
o For deck related first events, codes 1200 (load lines) and code 1900 (Marpol Annex II) are 
significant and positive. 
o For engine related first events, four codes remain of which three are positive and two are 
negative. Positive effects are with codes 700 (fire safety measures), 1400 (propulsion and 
aux. engines) and 1700 (Marpol Annex I) while negative effects are with codes 400 (food 
and catering) and code 2000 (Solas operat. deficiencies). 
 
Summary of Findings in relation to deficiencies 
It is difficult to interpret the significance and the sign of the parameters of the deficiency 
codes towards either the seriousness and with respect to the ship types or the casualty first 
events since the variable is not based on the last inspection only but also contains 
information from previous inspections. Sometimes, this means an accumulation of 
inspections and sometimes this means, only the last inspection which was performed at 
least six months or less before the casualty. The analysis is therefore only being seen as a 
first attempt to look at both aspects closer. 
 
What can be concluded from this portion of the analysis is that some inspections and the 
fact that deficiencies are found are effective towards decreasing the probability of having a 
casualty. This effect varies across ship types, seriousness of casualty and casualty first 
events. Code 1400 (propulsion & aux. engine) seems to be an important deficiency code 
which in the probability of detention does not come out to be very important in all regimes. 
It has a positive effect for serious and less serious casualties, in particular for dry bulk 
carriers and for casualty first events such as fire & explosion, wrecked/stranded/grounded 
and engine related casualty first events. This could indicate that there is room for 
improvement. It seems that deficiencies are found but due to lack of enforcement 
(detention) or follow up on deficiencies, the effect is positive rather than negative. It is 
important to notice though that when the vessel is in port and port state control is 
performed, the engines are not under full operation and it is therefore difficult to inspect 
some aspects of the main engine. 
 
Another code where its parameter shows a positive effect is the ISM code (code 2500) which 
captures the whole safety management system onboard a vessel. It is positive for serious 
casualties, general cargo vessels and tankers and for casualty first event collision and 
contact. On the other hand, code 2000 (Solas operational related deficiencies) is negative for 
serious casualties and engine related first events for the ship type general cargo. This could 
be interpreted as the effectiveness in rectifying the deficiencies or drills and therefore 
having a negative effect for general cargo ships. 
 
Another clear example is code 1800 (gas and chemical carriers) which is positive and 
significant for very serious casualties and casualty first events fire and explosion. This 
could be further identified as an area that should be looked at and has already been 
discussed at IMO during MSC (81) in May 200633. This finding confirms that there is 
problem with enforcing the legal conventions on chemical carriers. The next area will 
                                                
32 code 700 and code 1400 are significant at the 5% level only 
33 The author attended as observer MSC (81) in May 2006, IMO, London 
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present some graphs to visualize the findings. It will first look at the time in-between 
inspections, the effect of inspections and detention and the deficiencies themselves. 
 
Table 14 is based on the type I models where restrictions34 using the Wald Test were tested 
for the variables indicating where the vessel was inspected to see if the means differ. The 
null hypothesis in this case states that there is no significant difference across the regimes 
(ho= coefficients do not vary). The results indicate that while there is no significant 
difference with relation to very serious casualties (only one variable remains significant), for 
serious casualties, AMSA and the Viña del Mar MoU are apart from the IMOU. No 
difference can be seen for the Paris MoU and the USCG since as a benchmark, the Paris 
MoU was used and the USCG does not remain to be significant. 
 
Table 14: Testing of Restrictions (Wald Test) - Inspection Variables: Type I Models 
Very 
Serious 
Serious 
Restrictions/p-value 
Less Serious 
Restrictions/p-value 
AMSA=IMOU=VMOU 
(0.0017) – reject ho 
AMSA=IMOU=VMOU 
(0.0286) - do not reject ho 
AMSA=IMOU 
(0.0007)- reject ho 
AMSA=IMOU 
(0.1054)- do not reject ho 
IMOU=VMOU 
(0.0013) - reject ho 
IMOU=VMOU 
(0.0086)- reject ho 
 
Only the VMOU 
remains significant 
and shows a negative 
effect. There is no 
significant difference 
amongst the other 
regimes. 
AMSA=VMOU 
(0.07607) – do not reject ho 
AMSA=VMOU 
(0.2040) - do not reject ho 
Note: Figure in bracket is the p-value of the test, 1% significance level 
 
For less serious casualties, AMSA, the Indian Ocean MoU and the Viña del Mar Agreement 
do not show a difference (at the 1% significance level) while the USCG and the Paris MoU 
are not significant. Figure 10 to Figure 12 both visualize these effects for a particular ship 
for a particular vessel but not in a combined format. The variables indicating where a ship 
was inspected is constructed as a percentage fraction of each vessel to the total inspection a 
vessel had previously and not as a total sum of inspections which was used in the normal 
casualty models. What the variables give is a capture of the total inspection fraction of all of 
the regimes of a particular vessel where the Caribbean MoU had to be excluded from the 
models due to lack of data. 
 
In order to visualize the differences, a particular ship is chosen and its associated 
probability of casualty is calculated. In order to see the effect over time, the variable in 
question is increased by certain percentage fractions (10%) which can also be seen as an 
increase in the frequency of inspections. The interesting part in these graphs is to see how 
the regimes differ with respect to the probability of casualty. As mentioned before, only the 
Viña del Mar Agreement on PSC is significantly different from the other regimes for very 
serious casualties. The average is to be understood as the average of all regimes. 
 
For serious casualties, AMSA and the Indian Ocean MoU are very close and apart from the 
Indian Ocean MoU and the other regimes. For less serious casualties, AMSA, the Indian 
Ocean MoU and the Viña del Mar Agreement on PSC are similar (also confirmed 
previously) and below the average. They are different from the Paris MoU and the USCG. 
 
At first sight, the order of the regimes is not as one would have expected them to be. 
Regimes below the average seem to show a larger effect. On the other hand, it might also 
                                                
34 based on Wald Test for Testing Coefficient Restrictions, a standard procedure in Eviews 
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reflect the learning stage of a regime over the time period covered by the inspection data. 
By the end of 2004, the Paris MoU has been in existence since 1982 while the Indian Ocean 
MoU only exists since 7 years and the Viña del Mar since 13 years.  
 
Figure 10: Inspection Effect across Regimes: Very Serious 
Very Serious Casualty
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Figure 11: Inspection Effect across Regimes: Serious 
Serious Casualty
Inspection Effect - Difference across Regimes 
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Figure 12: Inspection Effect across Regimes: Less Serious 
Less Serious Casualty
Inspection Effect - Difference across Regimes
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The Indian Ocean MoU region has more local trade with ships that might show more 
obvious signs of being sub-standard and the effect of inspections are therefore to be 
expected to be higher than in other regions with better ships. In addition, the Paris MoU 
area has maintained the 25% target factor previously which could have led to the inspection 
of good ships in the past in order to fill the quota versus sub-standard ships when they have 
not been available in the area needed for inspection for the last six years. As for the Viña 
del Mar region, the region might show more of the sub-standard ships that have been 
driven out of the Paris MoU or the USCG over the last six years. 
 
The next section will give an overview in relation to the casualty first events based on the 
type III models and similar to the procedure described for the type II models. The results 
can be seen in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Testing of Restrictions (Wald Test) - Inspection Variables: Type III Models 
Model Type Variables Tested p-value 
Fire/Explosion VMOU=IMOU 0.5819 - do not reject ho 
Wrecked/Stranded/Grounded AMSA=IMOU 0.9359 - do not reject ho 
Collision/Contact AMSA=VMOU=IMOU 0.7131 - do not reject ho 
Deck Related First Events VMOU=IMOU 0.1136 - do not reject ho 
Engine Related First Events USCG=PMOU 0.0406 - do not reject ho 
Note: 1% significance level used 
 
One can see that there are no significant differences for the variables that are left in the 
models across the regimes and that the null hypothesis (ho= coefficients do not vary) can be 
rejected in all cases at a 1% significance level. The results are visualized with a combined 
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graph (Figure 13) which shows the average effect of inspection on the probability of casualty 
per first event for a dry bulk carrier. The average is based on an average of all regimes and 
is therefore more averaged out in comparison to each of the individual variables. 
 
Figure 13: Average Inspection Effect per Casualty First Event 
Average Inspection Effect per Casualty First Event
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The graph shows that the strongest effect can be seen for deck related first events followed 
by collision/contact similar to the category wrecked/stranded/grounded and fire/explosion. 
For engine related first events, the effect is slightly positive. Linking this graph back to the 
probability of detention and deficiency code 1400 (propulsion and aux. machinery) where 
the contribution weight of this code was found not to be very high across all regimes, one 
could conclude that there is room for improvement in this area.  
 
3.6. PSC Deficiencies and the Probability of Casualty 
The next area will provide a closer look at deficiencies in relation to seriousness and first 
events of a casualty and is based on the type I, type II and type III models. It visualizes the 
findings stated in Table 13 previously in order to facilitate the interpretation of the 
coefficients.  
 
The first set of graphs are based on the type II model (the combined model) where the 
deficiencies are multiplicative dummy variables of the ship types and combine very serious 
and serious casualties. Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the results for codes with negative 
effects and codes with positive effects.  
 
The negative effect of food and catering for container vessels cannot really be explained 
other than that an improvement in working and living conditions for crew members 
onboard have an overall positive effect on the performance of the crew.  
  28
Figure 14: Very Serious and Serious Casualties (Negative Effects) 
Very Serious and Serious per Ship Type (Negative Effects)
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Note: based on type II models 
 
The significance of the other two codes for general cargo ships are easier to interpret. 
According to the Paris MoU Manual for PSC Officers35 deficiencies in the area of load lines 
include overloading, freeboard markings, conditions of railings, cargo hatches, doors, 
ventilation pipes and lashings. It seems that general cargo vessel seems to show deficiencies 
in this area prior to a casualty and that these deficiencies are rectified. For load line, 
rectification might not be so easy and immediate while for deficiencies in the area of SOLAS 
related deficiencies, it can be rectified easier and therefore have an immediate effect. 
SOLAS related operational deficiencies include deficiencies such as the muster list, fire 
drills, abandon ship drills, the level of communication onboard, bridge operations, the 
operation of GMDSS and cargo operations. It shows that if port state control identifies these 
deficiencies and if they are rectified, they can have a negative effect. In addition, the drills 
might help in this respect to. The only regime who requires drills during an annual exam is 
the USCG.  
 
Figure 15 shows the deficiency codes that have a positive effect towards the probability of 
casualty. ISM appears twice (for tankers and general cargo) and codes associated with 
stability and structure (load lines and structural safety) are relevant for containers and 
tankers. It might be more difficult to rectify deficiencies in this area since it might take 
more time to do so. In the case of lack of follow up, it seems that ships with deficiencies in 
this area show a higher probability of having a very serious or serious casualty.  
 
 
                                                
35 Paris MoU, Manual for PSC Officers, Revision 8 
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Figure 15: Very Serious and Serious Casualties (Positive Effects) 
Very Serious and Serious per Ship Type (Positive Effects)
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Note: based on type II models 
 
Fire safety measures are relevant for general cargo and show that general cargo ships 
might show more problems with the actual equipment related to fire prevention while the 
drills and the performance of drills reflects the operational side which can have a negative 
effect. Very little effect can be seen by deficiencies in the area of propulsion and machinery 
for dry bulk vessels. 
 
What is not visualized here but clearly shown in Table 13 is the positive effect of code 1800 
(gas and chemical carriers) towards the probability of a very serious casualty. This code is 
associated with deficiencies in the area of cargo segregation, cargo transfers and ventilation 
systems, the cargo pump room, temperature controls, and fire protection of cargo deck 
areas, personal protection and emergency towing arrangements. It applies to chemical 
tankers, gas carrier and oil tankers and shows that this is an area port state control can 
improve in not only detecting the deficiencies but also in ensuring that they are rectified 
and that the ISM system onboard is implemented onboard which is further confirmed by 
the positive effect of the ISM code with tankers. This is somehow surprisingly given the fact 
that tankers undergo a significant amount of vetting inspections which also looks closely at 
the implementation of the ISM code. 
 
Figure 16 shows the deficiency codes which are left to be significant for less serious 
casualties for all ship types. It is less accurate than the previous models but confirms two 
areas – structural safety and propulsion and machinery with a moderate positive effect and 
Marpol Annex I (oil pollution) with a stronger positive effect.  
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Figure 16: Less Serious Casualties and Deficiencies 
Less Serious Casualty-all ship types
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Note: based on type I model – less serious 
 
Deficiencies in this area contain for instance the SOPEP (Ship oil emergency plan), the oil 
record book, the 15 ppm alarm and oil filtering equipment, the segregation of ballast tanks, 
the operation of COW (crude oil washing). The probability of detention is very strong in this 
area for the USCG especially for tankers but in aggregated form, for all ship types 
(contribution weight is about 21%), this code is not significant for very serious or less 
serious casualties but might play a role for less serious casualties and could be an area of 
potential problems. 
 
This last section takes a closer look at the various types of casualties and the deficiencies 
that were found during an inspection. A separate graph per casualty first event is produced 
and is shown in Figure 17 through Figure 21. 
 
Figure 17 shows the results for fire and explosion identified as first event. Fire and 
explosion in this case means a fire and explosion anywhere on the vessel where the main 
area of fire has been identified to be in the engine room. Code 1800 (oil, chemical tankers 
and gas carriers) and code 1400 (propulsion and machinery) both show a positive effect 
towards the probability of having a fire or explosion. This finding is interesting as it 
confirms a problem that is already known in the industry and which has been an agenda 
item during MSC36 (81) in May 2006 where a study conducted by an inter-industry 
workgroup identified 35 cases of fire and explosions on chemical and product tankers over 
the last 25 years. 
                                                
36 Maritime Safety Committee Meeting at IMO (10th to 19th May 2006) 
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Figure 17: Fire and Explosion and Deficiencies 
Fire and Explosion
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Note: based on type III model 
 
The group concluded that technical failure could not be identified but that the prime 
contributor was lack of following the proper operational guidelines which is partly reflected 
in the ISM system (onboard and shore side) and might also explain the positive contribution 
of the ISM code for tankers in Figure 15. From the port state control point of view, it shows 
that a certain lack of compliance has been detected but that the system lacks in 
enforcement and implementation. The same applies to propulsion and machinery where the 
effect is much less. 
 
Figure 18 shows the probability of engine related first events and Figure 19 gives an insight 
into the probability of deck related first events in relation to deficiencies previously found in 
port state control inspections.  
 
Engine related first events contain engine breakdowns, black outs, steering gear failure and 
propulsion failure. It is therefore not surprising that deficiencies associated with code 1400 
(Propulsion and machinery) shows the strongest positive contribution followed by Marpol 
Annex I (code 1700) and fire safety measures (code 700). Marpol Annex I has also been 
identified with a positive effect for less serious casualties which might also be reflected 
here. The code is not unrelated to the engine room but somehow not directly related to the 
events listed above since it deals with environmental issues (oil pollution) and all 
procedures connected to it. The fact that this code is positive can also just indicate the lack 
of the implementation of operational procedures in the engine room and that ships that do 
have a high probability of engine related casualties, also do have a problem in the area of 
pollution prevention and fire & safety measures. 
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Figure 18: Engine Related First Events and Deficiencies 
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Note: based on type III model 
 
On the other hand, two codes show a negative effect which are code 2000 (SOLAS 
operational related deficiencies) and code 400 (food and catering). Both codes also show a 
negative effect for very serious and serious casualties for general cargo ships and container 
vessels. It seems that drills and other operational related items do have a negative effect on 
the probability of having an engine related casualty. The code food and catering might just 
reflect the human factor such as living and working conditions in general which are also 
associated with food. 
 
Figure 19 shows the probability of deck related first events and two deficiency codes which 
remain significant – Marpol Annex II (code 1900) and load lines (code 1200). Deck related 
first events contain items such as deck maintenance and stability related items (capsizing, 
listing, cargo shifts and flooding). 
 
According to the Paris MoU PSC Manual for PSC Officers37, deficiencies associated with 
Marpol Annex II (Noxious Liquids in Bulk) are deficiencies such as the cargo record book, 
the P&A (Procedure & Arrangement Manual) manual, stripping and tank washing 
equipment, cargo heating systems and ventilation equipment. At first sight, this code does 
not seem to be directly associated with deck related first events but by taking a closer look, 
one can identify a connection, especially when it comes to cargo handling which might also 
be reflected in deficiencies associated with load lines where cargo shifts or flooding might be 
more relevant. Interesting to see is that for instance the ISM code is not relevant which is 
somehow unexpected. Overall, one can conclude that the lack of following proper cargo 
operation procedures (in what form ever) do have a positive influence on the probability of 
having a casualty. For port state control, this could mean that deficiencies in this area have 
                                                
37 Paris MoU, Manual for PSC Officers, Revision 8 
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been identified but that there is lack of ability to ensure that these procedures are followed 
in the future. 
 
Figure 19: Deck Related First Events and Deficiencies 
Deck Related First Events
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Note: based on type III model 
 
Figure 20 shows the effect of deficiencies on casualty first events associated with ships that 
were wrecked, stranded or grounded. This category is dominated by stranded and grounded 
ships versus wrecked ships. Three codes are significant and show a positive effect – code 
1000 (Alarm Signals), code 700 (fire safety measures) and code 1400 (propulsion and 
machinery) where the last two are only slightly significant. The more interesting group of 
deficiencies are the groups of alarm signals which contains deficiencies related to the 
general alarm, crew and fire alarm, steering gear alarm, engineer’s and other machinery 
alarms, inert gas alarm, UMS (unmanned machinery spaces) and boiler alarms. The types 
of alarms which can be brought into relation with the first event are probably the alarms 
associated with the steering gear and other machinery alarm. It seems that deficiencies are 
identified in this area by port state control and that the positive effect is rather strong. 
 
Figure 21 shows the last graph in this series and shows that deficiencies found in the area 
of ISM (code 2500) have a positive effect on the probability of having a collision or contact. 
The same applies for structural safety (code 900). Deficiencies in the 900 range contain 
closing devices (such as watertight doors), stability and loading information and 
instruments, steering gear, hull damage, the condition of ballast tanks, any kind of hull and 
bulkhead corrosion and cracking. 
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Figure 20: Wrecked/Stranded/Grounded and Deficiencies 
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Note: based on type III model 
 
Marpol related operational deficiencies (code 2100) are associated with oily mixtures in 
cargo spaces and other related items for cargo spaces of tankers. This code is not related to 
collisions and contacts and therefore cannot be interpreted. For code 900, items related to 
the steering gear might be very relevant in this category.  
 
The ISM code is certainly relevant as it might show lack of enforcement of safety 
procedures. ISM related deficiencies contain items such the safety and environmental 
policy, the definition of company responsibilities and the master’s responsibility, 
deficiencies in the area of shipboard operations, emergency preparedness, reporting and 
analysis of non-conformities, accidents and near misses, the maintenance of the vessel and 
company audits. Another area deals with resources and personnel. Violations against 
working and resting hours are not a separate code in the ISM group but are included in the 
deficiency group 200 – crew certificates.  
 
It is difficult to interpret this graph with certainty but the strong positive effect of ISM 
related deficiencies shows that vessels in this category have a higher probability of having a 
collision or contact. It might reflect fatigue or lack of bridge procedures as well as lack of 
overall onboard maintenance (as reflected in code 900). From a port state control 
perspective, this might also mean that the deficiencies are identified but that the 
enforcement onboard is lacking as is the rectification of such deficiencies. Especially ISM 
audits (if required) cannot be done immediately unless the ship is detained. When under 
pressure to keep schedules, ships might proceed and ignore some of the recommendations 
from port state control. 
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Figure 21: Collision and Contact and Deficiencies 
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Note: based on type III model 
 
On a short notice on ISM, the code’s origins go back as far as the late 1980’s when more 
concern arose as to the poor safety management of the industry. It was adopted in 199338 
and had to be implemented by 1 July 2002. The last Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 81) 
in December 2005 presented an impact assessment of the ISM code on the industry in 
which several areas of improvement could be identified as follows39: 
 
o More systematic training 
o Having an ISM Code performance measurement scheme 
o More monitoring of compliance 
o Integrating into employment requirements; and 
o Involving more people, especially seafarers in writing ISM manuals. 
 
Given the findings in this section of this analysis, the author can fully support these 
recommendations. Especially the last recommendation is very relevant. From the 25 
inspections and one ISM audit the author could observe during the course of this project, it 
has become apparent that very few management companies allow proper input from 
seafarers on the design and continuous improvement of the safety management system 
which is of direct impact of daily shipboard operations.  
 
                                                
38 MSC 81/17/1, Role of the Human Element, Assessment of the impact and effectiveness of 
implementation of the ISM Code, 21 December 2005, page 2 
39 MSC 81/17/1/ Role fo the Human Element, Assessment of the impact and effectivness of 
implementation of the ISM Code, 21 December 2005, page 14 
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On oil and chemical tankers, it has been observed that on many occasions, the system has 
been designed to only serve one purpose – which is to meet the requirements of the vetting 
inspection questionnaires and not the overall perspective which is to improve the safety 
level onboard a ship by taking into consideration the particular working environment 
onboard a vessel. This reduces the ISM code to a paper exercise rather than a workable 
system for the industry. The latest addition of the oil industry’s Tanker Management Self 
Assessment (TMSA) system in addition to ISM further proofs that ISM has reduced to a 
paper exercise. In theory, one safety management system should be sufficient and adaptable 
to the various industries within the shipping industry. TMSA allows compliance to four 
levels where the first level is seen to be the minimum requirement and meets the 
requirements of ISM. 
 
4. Conclusions on Casualties – Refined View 
The parameters of the variables indicating if a ship has been inspected by one of the 
industry vetting inspection regimes are all negative. The coefficients of the variable 
indicating time in-between inspections are not significant for very serious casualties but are 
positive for all other categories. For the casualty first events, it is only significant for fire & 
explosion and engine related first events. 
 
The variables indicating where the ship was inspected is mostly negative for serious and 
less serious casualties and only one regime remains significant for very serious casualties 
(Viña del Mar Agreement on PSC) while several other regimes appear to be significant for 
serious and less serious casualties. 
 
For the casualty first events, the parameters are mostly negative or not significant with the 
exception for engine related first events. Testing of restrictions shows that there is no 
significant difference with respect to the coefficients of the variables indicating where the 
ship was inspected and casualty first events at the 1% significance level. The strongest 
negative effect can be found on the probability of deck related first events (about 3%) and a 
slightly positive effect can be found for engine related casualty first events. 
 
The time span in-between inspection is not significant for very serious casualties but is for 
less serious and serious casualties. On average and regardless of the seriousness of 
casualty, the probability increases by 2.3% within the time frame of one year. For fire and 
explosion, this increase can be 2.7% and 0.5% for engine related casualties. 
 
With respect to the probability of casualty and frequency of inspection and detention, the 
probability of a casualty decreases on average while on the contrary, the probability of 
serious and less serious casualties increases with the frequency of inspection. The picture is 
similar for multiple detentions. The coefficients of the variables indicating if the ship has 
been detained are mostly not significant with the exception of less serious casualties and for 
the categories wrecked, stranded or grounded and engine related first events. For engine 
related first events, this variable is negative for one regime (USCG). 
 
It is difficult to interpret the significance and the signs of the parameters of the deficiency 
codes towards either the seriousness and with respect to the ship types or the casualty first 
events since the variable is not based on the last inspection only but is a summary of all 
inspections that were performed prior to a casualty. Sometimes, this means an 
accumulation of inspections and sometimes this means, only the last inspection which was 
performed at least six months or less before the casualty. The analysis is therefore only 
being seen as a first attempt to look at both aspects closer. 
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What can be concluded from this portion of the analysis is that some inspections and the 
fact that deficiencies are found are effective towards decreasing the probability of having a 
casualty. This effect varies across ship types, seriousness of casualty and casualty first 
events. Code 1400 (propulsion & aux. engine) seems to be an important deficiency code 
while in the probability of detention does not come out to be very important in all regimes. 
It has a positive effect for serious and less serious casualties, in particular for dry bulk 
carriers and for casualty first events such as fire & explosion, wrecked/stranded/grounded 
and engine related casualty first events. This could indicate that there is room for 
improvement. It seems that deficiencies are found but due to lack of enforcement 
(detention) or follow up on deficiencies (detentions), the effect is positive rather than 
negative. 
 
The same applies for another important code – the ISM code (code 2500) which captures the 
whole safety management system onboard a vessel. The parameter of this variable is 
positive for serious casualties, general cargo vessels and tankers and for casualty first event 
collision and contact. The ISM code captures the whole safety management onboard and its 
effect is only positive. It could mean that even though port state control detects deficiencies 
in the implementation of the ISM code onboard, the rectification or follow up on the 
deficiencies it not very successful and the lack of proper implementation onboard leads to an 
increase in the probability of having a casualty which can be very serious and serious and is 
more likely to be associated with a collision. 
 
On the other hand, code 2000 (Solas operational related deficiencies) is negative for serious 
casualties and engine related first events for the ship type general cargo. This could be 
interpreted as the effectiveness in rectifying the deficiencies and therefore having a 
negative effect for general cargo ships. It can also be interpreted that for instance increased 
drills can help in decreasing the probability of having a very serious casualty. 
 
Another clear example is code 1800 (gas and chemical carriers) which is positive and 
significant for very serious casualties and casualty first events fire and explosion. This 
could be further identified as an area that should be looked at and has already been on the 
agenda of MSC (81) in May 2006. This finding confirms that there is problem with enforcing 
the legal conventions on chemical carriers but that the main contributor was identified to be 
of human error by not following the proper procedures. 
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Ship Visits, Inspections, Surveys 
 
The ship names and IMO numbers are not disclosed as per the request of some of the ship 
owners/operators. 
 
PSC Inspection: Flag: Luxembourg, Ship Type: Containership, Surveyor: Aarnout 
Salwegter, Rotterdam, June 2004 
 
PSC Inspection: Flag: Syria, Ship Type: General Cargo, Surveyor: Walter De Graeve, 
Antwerp, July 2004 
 
PSC Inspection: Flag: Cyprus, Ship Type: General Cargo, Surveyor: Walter De Graeve, 
Antwerp, July 2004 
 
PSC Expanded Inspection: Flag: Grand Caymans, Ship Type: Bulk Carrier, Surveyor: 
Aarnout Salwegter, Amsterdam, August 2005 
 
PSC inspection/Detention: Flag: Ukraine, Ship Type: General Cargo, Inspector: J. P. Van 
Byten, Antwerp, October 2005. 
 
PSC safety inspection: Flag: Hong Kong, Ship Type: Dry Bulk, Inspector in charge: Ralph 
Savercool, New York, March 2006 
 
PSC security inspection: Flag: Liberia, Ship Type: Container, Inspector in charge: Diane R. 
Semmling, New York, March 2006  
 
PSC security inspection: Flag: Panama, Ship Type: Container, Inspector in charge: Diane R. 
Semmling, New York, March 2006  
 
Flag State Inspection: Flag: Malta, Ship Type: Container, Surveyor: Henk Engelsman, 
Rotterdam, August 2005 
 
Flag State Inspection: Flag: Malta, Ship Types: Bulk Carrier, Surveyor: Henk Engelsman, 
Rotterdam, October 2005, 
 
Class Annual Survey and Underwater Diving Inspection: Flag: Norwegian International 
Register, Ship Type: Oil/Bulk Carrier, Surveyor: Yuri Sakurada, DNV, Rotterdam, March 
2005 
 
Class Annual Survey: Flag: Norwegian International Register, Ship Type: Chemical 
Tanker, Surveyor: Yuri Sakurada, DNV, Rotterdam, May 2005 
 
Class Annual Survey: Flag: Malta, Ship Type: Crude Oil Tanker, Surveyor: Rob Pijper, 
Lloyd’s Register, Rotterdam, November 2005. 
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Class Annual Survey: Flag: Barbados, Ship Type: General Cargo Ship, Surveyor: Pieter 
Andringa, Germanischer Lloyd, Rotterdam, October 2005. 
 
Class Renewal Survey: Ship Name: Flag: Dutch, Ship Type: Chemical/Oil Product Tanker, 
Surveyor: Rob Pijper, Lloyd’s Register, Rotterdam Damen Shipyard, August 2005 
 
Class Follow Up: Flag: Cyprus, Ship Type: Bulk Carrier, Surveyor: Rob Pijper, Lloyd’s 
Register, Rotterdam, September 2005 
 
ISM Audit: Flag: Liberia, Ship Type: Juice Carrier, Surveyor: Rob Pijper, Lloyd’s Register, 
Rotterdam, October 2005 
 
Vetting Inspection (CDI): Flag: Dutch, Ship Type: Chemical Tanker, Inspector (CDI): Henk 
Engelsman, Rotterdam, August 2005 
 
Vetting Inspection (CDI): Flag: Bahamas, Ship Type: Chemical/Oil Tanker, Inspector (CDI): 
Henk Engelsman, Rotterdam, October 2005; 
 
Vetting Inspection (SIRE, Kuwait Oil): Flag: Sweden, Ship Type: Oil Tanker, Inspector 
(OCIMF): Henk Engelsman, Rotterdam, September 2005 
 
Vetting Inspection (SIRE, Eni Oil): Flag: Saudi Arabia, Ship Type: Chemical Tanker, 
Inspector (OCIMF): Henk Engelsman, Rotterdam, October 2005; 
 
Vetting Inspection (SIRE, Statoil): Flag: Sweden, Ship Type: Tanker, Inspector (OCIMF): 
Henk Engelsman, Rotterdam, June 2006 
 
Vetting Inspection (SIRE, Statoil): Flag: Liberia, Ship Type: Oil Tanker, Inspector (OCIMF): 
Henk Engelsman, Rotterdam, June 2006 
 
Vetting Inspection (Rightship): Flag: Hong Kong, Ship Type: Dry Bulk Carrier, Inspector 
(Rightship): Dennis Barber, Ijmuiden, March 2006 
 
P&I Club Inspection: Flag: Greece, Ship Type: Bulk Carrier, Inspector: Walter Vervloesem, 
Ghent, October 2005; 
 
Marpol Inspection: Flag: Norway, Ship Type: Oil Tanker, Port Superindendent: Mr. Cees-
Willem Koorneef, Rotterdam, August 2004 
 
Marpol Inspection: Flag: Panama, Ship Type:OBO, Port Superindendent: Mr. Cees-Willem 
Koorneef, Rotterdam, August 2004 
 
Ship Visit (VLCC): Flag: Bahamas, Ship Type: Oil Tanker, Class: ABS, Rotterdam, October 
2005 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Grouping of Countries of Ownership 
The grouping of ownership of a vessel was made according to Alderton and Winchester 
(1999) and is as follows: 
 
1. Old Open Registries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, Honduras, 
Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Panama, St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
 
2. New Open Registries: Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Cambodia, Canary Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Cook Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Gibraltar, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mauritius, 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu and Vanuatu 
 
3. International Registries: Anguila, British Virgin Islands, Channel Islands, DIS, 
Falklands, Faeroes, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Kerguelen Islands, Macao, Madeira, NIS, 
Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Singapore, Turks and Caicos, Ukraine, Wallis and 
Fortuna, Netherlands Antilles 
 
4. Traditional Maritime Nations: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela. 
 
5. Emerging Maritime Nations: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Comoro, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ecuador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, North Korea, South Korea, 
Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, 
Micronesia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, St. Helena, St. Kitts & 
Nevis, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Solomon Islands, Somalia Republic, Sudan, Surinam, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UAE, Vietnam, Yemen 
 
6. Other/Unknown: Undefined by dataset, Unknown (Fairplay), Azores, Cameroon, 
Greenland, Monaco, Puerto Rico, Serbia & Montenegro, St. Pierre & Miquel 
 
